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Preserving Transparency and Accountability in
Optimistic Fair Exchange of Digital Signatures
Xinyi Huang, Yi Mu, Senior Member, IEEE, Willy Susilo, Senior Member, IEEE, Wei Wu, Jianying Zhou, and
Robert H. Deng, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Optimistic fair exchange (OFE) protocols are useful
tools for two participants to fairly exchange items with the aid of
a third party who is only involved if needed. A widely accepted
requirement is that the third party’s involvement in the exchange
must be transparent, to protect privacy and avoid bad publicity. At
the same time, a dishonest third party would compromise the fair-
ness of the exchange and the third party thus must be responsible
for its behaviors. This is achieved in OFE protocols with another
property called accountability. It is unfortunate that the account-
ability has never been formally studied in OFE since its introduc-
tion ten years ago. In this paper, we fill these gaps by giving the
first complete definition of accountability in OFE where one of the
exchanged items is a digital signature and a generic (also the first)
design of OFE where transparency and accountability coexist.
Index Terms—Accountability, fair exchange, generic design,
transparency.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE objective of a fair exchange protocol is to allow twoparties to fairly exchange their items so that no one can
gain any advantage. A straightforward solution is to introduce
a trusted third party as a mediator: each party sends the item
to the trusted third party, who upon verifying the correctness of
both items, forwards each item to the other party. Such protocols
require that the third party be always online, as each exchange
needs the assistance from the third party. In order to alleviate the
requirement of an always-online third party, Asokan et al. [1] in-
troduced the notion of optimistic fair exchange (hereinafter re-
ferred to as “OFE”). OFE also makes use of a third party (called
the arbitrator), but it does not need to be always online; instead,
the arbitrator only gets involved if something goes wrong (e.g.,
one party attempts to cheat or other faults occur).
A typical example of OFE is as follows: Two participants
(say, Alice and Bob) first agree on the items to be exchanged:
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Alice’s item is a valid (e.g., the signature on a
credit card purchase) and Bob’s item is denoted by (e.g.,
a book). At the end of the exchange, Alice should have
and Bob should have the .
1) Alice starts the exchange by generating a
and sending it to Bob.
2) Bob verifies the and sends to Alice
if the is valid.
3) Upon receiving , Alice generates a and
sends it to Bob.
4) If Bob does not receive the , he can ob-
tain it from the arbitrator who is able to convert the
to the . This property guar-
antees that Bob will obtain the if Alice
refuses to send it after Step 2.
In the above scenario, Alice is usually called the “signer” and
Bob is called the “verifier.” The exchange between the signer
and the verifier has attracted much attention from researchers on
OFE, and it is also the case which OFE refers to in the remainder
of this paper. (But readers should bear in mind that OFE is a
broad notion and includes many other types of exchanges.)
To ensure the fairness of exchange, there are two parties who
can generate full signatures in OFE: the signer and the arbi-
trator. Thus, full signatures can be classified (according to the
signature producer) into two types: actual signatures (generated
by the signer) and resolved signatures (generated by the arbi-
trator). It has been widely accepted that OFE protocols must
have the property of “resolution ambiguity,” namely valid re-
solved signatures should be at least computationally indistin-
guishable from valid actual signatures [2]–[6]. This will make
the arbitrator’s involvement transparent and avoid bad publicity
when network failure occurs. Another motivation for resolution
ambiguity is that the receiver of a “resolved signature” should
not be treated by others any differently than the receiver of
an “actual signature.” The arbitrator in an OFE protocol with
resolution ambiguity is called as a “transparent third party.”
However, a fully transparent third party (e.g., actual signatures
and resolved signatures have identical probability distributions)
could also compromise the fairness of the exchange.
In order to make the exchange fair, the arbitrator (at Step 4
in the scenario described previously) must check if the verifier
has fulfilled the obligation before converting the partial signa-
ture to the full signature. Otherwise, the verifier would obtain
the full signature without fulfilling the obligation and the pro-
tocol is unfair to the signer. Most OFE protocols deal with this
issue in a trivial way, by assuming that the arbitrator will pro-
duce a full signature for the verifier if and only if the verifier
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can provide a valid proof of fulfilling the obligation. This as-
sumption, however, may not hold in practice where the arbi-
trator could be dishonest. One of the biggest threats to OFE is
the arbitrator–verifier collusion: the arbitrator converts a partial
signature to a full one without performing any check. While it
is hard to prevent such dishonest behaviors from occurring, we
believe it should be at least feasible to identify the misbehaving
party. In this case, a fully transparent third party is certainly not
desirable.
A. Related Work
As one of the fundamental problems, OFE has been studied
extensively since its introduction. As commonly known, OFE
can be constructed from verifiably encrypted signature [7]–[12]
or sequential two-party multisignature [13], [3]. Several OFE
security properties are considered to be important, including
(but not limited to): abuse-free [14], [15], accountability [8]
(previously called as the verifiability of the third party in [16]),
multiuser security [2], [17], [6], security in chosen-key model
[4], nonrepudiation [5], [18], [19], setup-free and standalone
[20], [21], signer ambiguity [22], stateless-recipient [23], im-
pact of system failures on the fairness [24], timely termination
[7], [8], and transparent third party [5] (also known as resolu-
tion ambiguity). In the following, we only review the notion of
accountability, which is the focus of this paper.
Accountability: In general, accountability requires that if a
desired goal of the protocol is not met then some misbehaving
parties should be (rightly) blamed [25]. The introduction of ac-
countability in OFE (and equivalently, accountable OFE) was
first given in [8].
As both the signer and the arbitrator can generate full signa-
tures, it would be desirable if a full signature contains the in-
formation of its producer, especially when misbehavior occurs:
not only could the arbitrator generate full signatures without
checking if the verifier has fulfilled the obligation, the signer
and the verifier could also frame the third party who does not
misbehave [8]. The purpose of accountable OFE is to identify
the party who is responsible for the full signature, and thus force
the arbitrator and the signer to behave honestly when generating
full signatures. This requires that actual signatures (generated
by the signer) be distinguishable from resolved signatures (gen-
erated by the arbitrator).
As shown in [8], an OFE protocol will be accountable if ac-
tual signatures and resolved signatures have obviously different
forms: given a valid full signature, one (with only public infor-
mation) can easily tell who is the full signature generator. To
the best of our knowledge, it is the only known design of ac-
countable OFE. However, the solution violates the requirement
of transparent third party, where resolved signatures should be at
least computationally indistinguishable from actual signatures.
This partly contributes to explaining the lack of further research
on accountable OFE since its introduction a decade ago.
B. Motivations and Contributions
This paper is motivated by the following two questions:
1) What are the properties an accountable OFE protocol
should possess?
2) How can we design an accountable OFE protocol with a
transparent third party?
As an important notion to solve practical issues, accountable
OFE receivedmuch less attention than what it deserves. To date,
it remains unknown what exactly an accountable OFE protocol
is and what properties it should have, although the notion has
a ten-year history. The lack of satisfactory answers to those
questions has hindered the development of the research on ac-
countable OFE. We believe it is worthwhile (both in theory and
in practice) to formally investigate accountable OFE and pro-
vide its precise definitions. On the other hand, accountability
and transparency (equivalently, transparent third party) seem to
contradict each other [26] and cannot coexist in OFE. Account-
ability requires that actual signatures and resolved signatures be
distinguishable, while transparency requires them be (at least
computationally) indistinguishable. To date, there are no OFE
protocols accommodating both properties. (The existing design
of accountable OFE [8] has a nontransparent third party.)
The contributions of this paper lie in the following aspects:
1) The definition of OFE is refined by introducing three new
algorithms, which we believe can capture the essential re-
quirements of accountable OFE.
2) We introduce several security notions an accountable OFE
protocol should satisfy. Each notion captures a potential
attack on the accountability of OFE and is defined in a
formal game-based model.
3) We provide a generic (also the first) design of OFE with
transparency and accountability, where the arbitrator’s
involvement is (computationally) transparent and the
accountability does not rely on any other third parties. The
identity of the full signature producer remains unknown
until certain proofs are issued, either by the signer or by
the arbitrator.
4) The generic protocol is based on well-studied cryp-
tographic primitives. We prove (in the random oracle
model) that it satisfies all security requirements defined
in this paper, assuming that the underlying primitives
satisfy certain security notions. In addition, we provide
an efficient instantiation and two variants of the generic
protocol.
Section II reviews the existing definition of normal OFE and
defines accountable OFE.
II. FORMAL DEFINITIONS OF ACCOUNTABLE OFE
This section formally defines accountable OFE and its secu-
rity notions. We first review the definition of a normal OFE pro-
tocol [2], [27].
Definition 1: An OFE protocol is made up of seven algo-
rithms: , , , , , , and .
Given a security parameter , these algorithms are defined
as follows.
1) . On input the param-
eter , the arbitrator executes this algorithm to obtain
a public–private key pair .
2) . On input the param-
eter , the signer executes this algorithm to obtain
a public–private key pair .
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3) . On input a message , ’s
private key and the arbitrator’s public key , the
partial signing algorithm outputs a partial signature
.
Here, should include the description of the items to be
exchanged between and . This will help the arbitrator
process the resolution request. Notice that the partial sig-
nature is not ’s agreement of sending its item to ,
even though in some concrete constructions is a clas-
sical digital signature. Instead, only a full signature (will
be defined shortly) can be viewed as ’s agreement of ful-
filling its obligation (as described in ). The partial signa-
ture only shows ’s willingness to send its item to
if fulfills its obligation.
4) . On input a pair
and two public keys , this algorithm
outputs “1” (if is valid) or “0” (otherwise).
is said to be a valid message–partial-signature pair under
if , .
5) . On input a message , ’s
private key , (optionally) ’s valid partial signature
on and (optionally) the arbitrator’s public key ,
this algorithm outputs a full signature .
To distinguish from the partial signature generated by
, is called the full signature.
6) . On input a pair
and two public keys , this algorithm outputs
“1” (if is valid) or “0” (otherwise).
is said to be a valid message–signature pair under
if .
7) . As a resolution algorithm,
it is executed by the arbitrator if the verifier does not
receive the full signature from , but has the signer ’s
valid partial signature on and has fulfilled the obli-
gation to . On input a valid message–partial-signature
pair under and the arbitrator’s pri-
vate key , this algorithm outputs a full signature .
Correctness: The verification algorithms and will
output “1” if signatures are generated according to the protocol
specification:
1) ;
2)
; and
3)
.
Remark: Definition 1 is essentially the same as those in [2]
and [27], but with the only difference that the partial signature
is allowed as an optional input to . This is due to the fact
that does exist when runs the algorithm .
Security in the Multiuser Setting: Due to [2], [6], an OFE
protocol must satisfy the following security requirements in the
multiuser setting.
1) Security against Signers: The signer should not be able to
produce a valid partial signature which cannot be trans-
formed into a valid full signature by an honest arbitrator.
2) Security against Verifiers: The verifier should not be able
to transform a valid partial signature into a valid full sig-
nature, without explicitly asking the arbitrator to do so.
3) Security against the Arbitrator: The arbitrator should not
be able to produce a valid full signature on message
without explicitly asking the signer to produce a partial
signature on .
Due to page limitation, these notions will not be revisited in this
paper. Please refer to [2], [6] for their formal definitions.
A. Accountable OFE
As we have briefly introduced in Section I-A, a valid full sig-
nature of an accountable OFE protocol must provide the infor-
mation about the signature producer, such that it will be feasible
to verify whether a full signature is generated by the signer or
by the arbitrator. At the same time, we want to design an ac-
countable OFE protocol where the arbitrator’s involvement in
the exchange is transparent. A promising approach to achieve
our purpose is to keep the identity of the full signature producer
unknown to outsiders until a piece of proof is issued, namely:
1) Given a valid full signature and other public information,
it is computationally infeasible to tell who is the signature
producer.
2) Given a valid full signature, both the signer and the arbi-
trator can independently generate evidence of the signature
producer’s identity. This will identify the entity who, either
the signer or the arbitrator, should take the full responsi-
bility for generating the full signature.
With this in mind, we first introduce the algorithms of which an
accountable OFE protocol consists.
Definition 2: An accountable OFE protocol is made up of
ten algorithms: , , , , , , ,
, , and . With a parameter , the
first seven algorithms are the same as those in Definition 1 and
the remaining three are defined as follows:
8) .
On input a valid message–signature pair under
and the signer’s private key , this
algorithm outputs a proof to claim the signature
(if is an output of the algorithm ) or a proof
to deny the signature (in all other cases).
9) .
On input a valid message–signature pair under
, and the arbitrator’s private key , this
algorithm outputs a proof to claim the signature
(if is an output of the algorithm ) or a proof
to deny the signature (in all other cases).
10) . On
input a valid message–signature pair under
, , and a proof , the output of this
algorithm is “ ” (if can prove as an output
of the algorithm ), “ ” (if can prove as an
output of the algorithm ), or the symbol “ ” (if
does not contain enough information to identify the full
signature producer, e.g., is a random string).
Correctness: In addition to those required in normal OFE,
there is an additional requirement in accountable OFE: Given
a valid message–signature pair under and
a proof generated by the algorithm or ,
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. In other words, any valid full
signatures can be either claimed or denied.
Three remarks on Definition 2.
1) The proof-generation needs the private key or .
This allows the signer and the arbitrator to independently
generate the proof.
2) The private key or is the only secret information
needed to generate the proof. There is no need to record
other secret information (e.g., random numbers) that one
used during the generation of full signatures.
3) The algorithm does not need the assistance from
any additional third parties, since those parties could
refuse to provide the assistance when colluding with the
signer or the arbitrator. The proof generated by
or , together with other public information, is
sufficient to identify the full signature producer.
B. Oracles Accessible by Adversaries
We now define the security notions an accountable OFE pro-
tocol should satisfy. Accountable OFE must satisfy the secu-
rity requirements reviewed in Definition 1, which are essen-
tial for all OFE protocols. The focus of this section is to de-
fine the accountability in OFE. As we shall show, it consists of
several security notions. Each security notion is motivated by
a potential attack on the accountability of OFE, followed by a
game-based model between the adversary and the challenger.
In most games, the challenger will generate the arbitrator’s key
pair and send the public key to the adversary,
who can make queries to the following oracles.
• . This oracle executes the algorithm
and generates a key pair for the user . It
also maintains a list which is initially empty. After
creating the user , this oracle adds on the
list and sends to the adversary. In this case,
we say has been created. Notice that other oracles only
answer queries on created users.
• . On input the public key of a created user,
this oracle outputs its private key .
• . On input a pair , this oracle runs
and responds with a partial signa-
ture.
• . On input a triple satisfying
, this oracle runs
and responds with an actual
signature.
• . On input a triple satisfying
, this oracle runs
and responds with a resolved
signature.
• . On input a valid message–signature pair
under and a symbol
, this oracle responds with a proof by
running if ,
or if .
In the random oracle model, adversaries are allowed to make
requests to random oracles. We will use the following two no-
tations in the security definition.
• -adversary: A probabilistic adversary who can make
up to queries in polynomial time .
• : The query cannot appear as a
request to any oracle .
C. Accountability
We define three security notions which we believe are neces-
sary to make an OFE protocol accountable.
Type I Accountability: This notion is motivated by the fol-
lowing attack: a dishonest signer wishes to generate a full sig-
nature which can be proved as an output of the algorithm .
Such a successful attack will enable the signer to frame the arbi-
trator for generating a full signature (which is actually generated
by the signer). The attack is formally defined as follows.
Phase 1: The challenger generates the arbitrator’s key pair
by running . The adversary is given the
arbitrator’s public key .
Phase 2: The adversary can adaptively make queries to all
oracles in Section II-B. At the end of this phase, the adversary
generates a public key and the challenger adds the pair
to , which means that has been created but
the challenger may not know the corresponding private key.
Phase 3: The adversary continues making queries to
and with the restriction that .
We disallow such queries since is provided by the adver-
sary and the challenger may not have the private key.
Phase 4: The adversary outputs a valid message–signature
pair under and a proof such that
.
The success probability that the adversary has in the game is
. An OFE protocol is
-Type-I-Accountable if no -adversary can have suc-
cess probability more than in the above game.
Type II Accountability: The attacking scenario associated
with Type II accountability is to simulate a dishonest arbitrator,
who wishes to generate a full signature that can be proved
as an output of the algorithm . As the counterpart of the
attack considered in Type I accountability, such a successful
attack will make the protocol unfair to the signer. Type II
accountability is formally defined as follows.
Phase 1: The adversary makes a query to and lets
the response be a public key . After that, the adversary gen-
erates the arbitrator’s public key and sends it to the chal-
lenger.
Phase 2: The adversary can make queries to all ora-
cles in Section II-B except , with the restriction that
. (Recall that is generated by the
adversary.)
Phase 3: The adversary outputs a valid pair under
and a proof such that and
.
The success probability that the adversary has in the game is
. An OFE protocol is
-Type-II-Accountable if no -adversary can have
success probability more than in the above game.
Type III Accountability: Another threat on accountability is
that the signer and the arbitrator can both claim (or, deny) a
valid full signature . As an example, the evidence generated
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by the signer proves that the arbitrator is the producer of ,
while the arbitrator proves that is generated by the signer.
We believe an OFE protocol should be accountable; even the
signer and the arbitrator collude with each other by sharing all
secret information, and generating the signature and the proof
in a cooperative way. This is formally defined as follows.
Phase 1: Given the system parameter, the adversary outputs
two different public keys and .
Since both keys are generated by the adversary, there is no need
to provide the adversary with any oracle access.1
Phase 2: The adversary outputs a valid message–signature
pair under and two proofs .
The adversary wins the game if one of the following two re-
quirements is satisfied:
1) can be both claimed by the signer and the arbi-
trator, i.e., and
; or
2) can be both denied by the signer and the arbi-
trator, i.e., and
.
An OFE protocol is -Type-III-Accountable if no -time ad-
versary can win the game with probability more than .
Remark: An OFE protocol with Type III accountability does
not guarantee Type I accountability or Type II accountability.
As an example, an adversary can break Type I accountability
by successfully forging an output of but cannot prove it as
an output of .
Definition 3 (Accountable OFE): An accountable OFE pro-
tocol must be Type I Accountable, Type II Accountable, and
Type III Accountable.
D. Transparent Third Party
This section is devoted to the definition of transparent third
party. In an OFE protocol, transparent third party (equivalently,
resolution ambiguity) requires that it should be (at least compu-
tationally) infeasible to distinguish a valid actual signature (gen-
erated by the signer) from a valid resolved signature (generated
by the arbitrator). It can protect the privacy of a full signature
generator and avoid bad publicity. This property is defined by
the following game.
Phase 1: The challenger generates the arbitrator’s key pair
by running the algorithm . The adversary
is given .
Phase 2: The adversary can adaptively issue queries to all
oracles in Section II-B.
At the end of this phase, the adversary outputs a message ,
a partial signature , and a public key (which is gener-
ated by ), with restrictions that and
.
Phase 3: Upon receiving , the challenger picks
a random bit and generates the full signature ac-
cordingly. If , . Otherwise,
. In either case, is given to the
adversary.
1An exception is that if the security of the protocol is considered in the random
oracle model, the adversary can make requests to random oracles before gener-
ating public keys.
Phase 4: Given , the adversary can continue making re-
quests to all oracles, but with restrictions that
and . At the end of this phase, the ad-
versary outputs its guess .
The success probability that the adversary has in the game is
.
Definition 4 (Transparent Third Party): The third party in an
OFE protocol is -Transparent if no -adversary can
have success probability more than in the above game.
Remark: Definition 4 is essentially the same as the prop-
erty “ambiguity” defined in [2], which requires that valid actual
signatures be computationally indistinguishable from valid re-
solved signatures.
Next section briefly introduces the preliminaries needed for our
design of accountable OFE with a transparent third party.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Before presenting the details, we briefly review some crypto-
graphic primitives which will be used in our construction.
A. (Strongly) Existentially Unforgeable Digital Signatures
A signature scheme consists of three algorithms (KeyGen,
Sign, Ver) associated with key generation, signing, and verifi-
cation, respectively. The signer runs KeyGen to generate a pri-
vate–public key pair . On input a private key and a
message , the Sign algorithm generates a signature on .
On input a message–signature pair and a public key ,
the verification algorithm Ver outputs “1” if is a valid signa-
ture, or “0” otherwise. We review the security requirements of
digital signatures as follows.
The probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary is al-
lowed to adaptively make queries to a signing oracle, namely
the adversary can query the signing oracle to obtain valid signa-
tures of adaptively chosen messages. Let be the set
of messages chosen by the adversary and be the
set of corresponding message–signature pairs. After all queries
are made, the adversary outputs a pair and wins the
game if . We say a signature scheme is
—Existentially Unforgeable—f no -adversary
can win the game with probability more than and .
We say a signature scheme is —Strongly Existen-
tially Unforgeable—f no -adversary can win the game
with probability more than and . Several
generic methods [28], [27], [29], [30] have been proposed
to convert an existentially unforgeable signature scheme to a
strongly existentially unforgeable signature scheme.
B. SPK: Signatures Based on Proofs of Knowledge
Let be a binary relation. We say that
is polynomially bounded if there exists a polynomial such that
for any .We say that is anNP-relation
if it is polynomially bounded and there exists a polynomial-time
algorithm for deciding membership in . TheNP-language
associated with is the set of for which there exists such
that . A proof of knowledge [31] for an NP-relation
is a protocol whereby there is a common input to the prover
and the verifier, and a private input to the prover. The prover
tries to convince the verifier that . One example of the
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proof of knowledge is the -protocol with correctness, special
soundness, and special (honest-verifier) zero-knowledge [32]
(e.g., GQ protocol [33] and Schnorr protocol [34]). It is known
that any language in NP has a -protocol if one-way functions
exist [35], [36]. Given two -protocols, i.e., for and
for , we can construct another -protocol (called
OR-proof) [32] which allows the prover to prove that given two
inputs , , he knows such that either or
without revealing which is the case (called the
witness indistinguishability property [37]).
One can apply the Fiat–Shamir heuristic [38] to convert a
-protocol into a signature on a message . This is called
as signatures based on proofs of knowledge in [39] (or, SPK
for short) and denoted by . An
SPK shows that a person who knows a witness such that
in a relation has signed the message . In
particular, can be the combination of two or more
statements with the form “ ” (all statements are
true) or “ ” (one of the statements is true).
As a signature scheme, the existential unforgeability of SPK
can be proved in the random oracle model [40], [41]. An SPK
is said to be complete if the is true and the prover
with the knowledge of can always be successful to generate
a proof to convince the verifier. An SPK is -Sound if the
is false, then no -time prover can convince the ver-
ifier that the is true with success probability more
than . An SPK is -Valid if an algorithm can success-
fully convince the verifier with probability , then there
is a -time knowledge extractor who can use to extract the se-
cret with probability more than . Detailed definitions
of those notions can be found in [31] and [39].
C. Undeniable Signatures
The concept of undeniable signatures was introduced by
Chaum and van Antwerpen [42]. The most distinctive feature
of undeniable signatures is that signature verification needs the
assistance from the signer: An undeniable signature can only be
verified by someone who knows the private key, or by a proof
generated by the private key owner.
An undeniable signature scheme - is made up of fol-
lowing algorithms:
• . On input the parameter (including
a security number and the message space ), the user
runs this algorithm to generate a key pair
. Here, is anNP-relation specified in .
• . Given a message , one can
generate an undeniable signature using and the
signing algorithm . The verification algorithm
, by taking the input and ,
outputs “1” (if is valid) or “0” (otherwise). Let
.
• . Given a message–signature pair
and a public key , the prover uses the cor-
responding private key to prove by
running the protocol with the verifier. Oth-
erwise, the prover uses to prove by
running the protocol. In undeniable signatures,
these two protocols are usually full-fledge zero-knowledge
protocols.
To serve the purpose of this paper, we require that one
can use the private key to generate efficient SPKs for
and . Such SPKs exist
in several undeniable signature schemes, especially those
based on the discrete logarithm problem and its variants
[42], [43]. A concrete example is given at the end of this
section. (Note that those SPKs cannot be used as confirma-
tion or disavowal protocols since they are ordinary signa-
tures.)
The correctness requires that
.
We list the security notions an undeniable signature
scheme should satisfy. In all definitions, the adversary
is allowed to make (in an adaptive manner) and
queries to the challenger, who re-
sponds with the output of the corresponding algorithm.
Unforgeability: Given a public key , the adversary out-
puts a pair after all queries are made, with the re-
striction that is a fresh message, i.e., does not appear
as one of queries. An undeniable signature scheme is
-Existentially Unforgeable if no -adversary can
create a pair with probability more than .
Anonymity: Roughly speaking, this notion requires that the
adversary be unable to tell who generates an undeniable signa-
ture. Given two public keys and , the adversary can
issue queries adaptively. In a certain phase, the adversary sends
a fresh message to the challenger, who flips a random coin
and generates a signature such that
. After receiving , the adversary can continue making
queries with restrictions that cannot be chosen as one of
queries or queries. After all
queries are made, the adversary outputs a bit . Let
be the success probability that the adversary has in the game.
We say an undeniable signature scheme is -Anony-
mous if no -adversary can have success probability more
than .
Notice that some undeniable signature schemes (e.g., [44])
have a stronger anonymity than we defined above, in the
sense that the adversary is allowed to make queries adaptively
with the only restriction that cannot appear as one
of queries. Such schemes certainly
satisfy the above definition of anonymity.
Collision-Resistance in Undeniable Signatures: In the game
of collision-resistance in undeniable signatures, the adversary
is allowed to generate two different public keys and .
The adversary wins the game if it can output a pair
such that , i.e., is a valid undeni-
able signature under both and . We say an undeniable
signature scheme is -Collision-Resistant if no -time ad-
versary can win the above gamewith probability more than .
Below is a concrete undeniable signature scheme with colli-
sion-resistance.
Below is a concrete scheme which satisfies all the above se-
curity requirements.
The FDH Variant of Chaum’s Undeniable Signature [42]:
The is , where is an Abelian
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group of prime order , is a generator of , and is
a hash function: .
• . This algorithm outputs a key pair ,
where is a random element in and .
The NP-relation is defined as
.
• and . For a message , the undeni-
able signature is . To verify an undeni-
able signature , algorithm will output “1” if
and “0” otherwise.
• . The available protocols are re-
cently revisited in [45], whose details are omitted here.
One can generate efficient SPKs to prove whether a
given undeniable signature is valid or not, by applying
Fiat–Shamir heuristic [38] to the three-move honest-ver-
ifier zero-knowledge proof for Chaum’s scheme. The
protocol is given in [46] and revisited in [45].
The FDH variant of Chaum’s scheme with NIZK confirmation
and disavowal protocols is existentially unforgeable if the com-
putational Diffie–Hellman problem is infeasible in [45]. The
anonymity of Chaum’s scheme can be reduced to the hardness
of the decisional Diffie–Hellman problem in [47]. Chaum’s
undeniable signature is also collision-resistant: If is a valid
undeniable signature under two public keys and , then
. This contradicts the requirement that be dif-
ferent from .
D. Collision-Resistant Hashing
Let be a keyed hash family of functions
indexed by . We say that algorithm
has advantage in breaking the collision-resistance of if
,
where the probability is over the random choice of and the
random bits of . We say a hash family is -Collision-
Resistant if no -time adversary can have advantage more than
in breaking the collision-resistance of .
IV. GENERIC DESIGN OF ACCOUNTABLE OFE WITH A
TRANSPARENT THIRD PARTY
This section is devoted to the description and the analysis of
a generic design of accountable OFE with a transparent third
party.
We start from the generic construction of multiuser secure
OFE proposed in [2]. The partial signature in [2] is an ordinary
signature of the signer, and the full signature consists of a partial
signature and an OR-Signature, which can be generated by the
signer or by the arbitrator. Our construction employs a similar
idea but has the following differences.
1) The signer and the arbitrator generate their key pairs in an
undeniable signature scheme.
2) The partial signature is a signature based on proof of
knowledge (SPK) generated by the signer using his/her
private key.
3) The full signature consists of four components
: (1) is the partial signature, (2) is a
random salt, (3) is an undeniable signature, and (4) is
another SPK proving that is a valid undeniable signature
generated by the signer or by the arbitrator.
This completes the high-level description of our design, whose
details are given as follows.
A. Generic Construction
Let be the parameter in an
undeniable signature scheme -
.
We need three hash functions
and , which are chosen from
the collision-resistant hash family . Here, is the
message space and is the security number defined
in . The parameter in our construction is
– .
1) . Given , the arbitrator runs the al-
gorithm to obtain a pair .
Here, is an NP-relation defined in .
2) . Given , the signer runs
to obtain a pair .
3) . Given a message , uses
to calculate
. The partial signature of is .
4) . Given and , one
can verify if is a correct
. This algorithm outputs “1” if it is correct. Oth-
erwise, it outputs “0.”
5) . Given a message , its valid par-
tial signature and the arbitrator’s public key ,
will choose a random element and calculate
as follows:
• uses the private key to generate an undeniable
signature on the message .
That is, and .
• then proves that is a valid undeniable signature
under or , by calculating (an OR-proof)
. Here, ,
“ ”,
“ ” and
. Notice that is able to calcu-
late a correct if is generated correctly. (In this case,
is true.)
Due to the property of undeniable signatures, one is not
able to verify with only public information. Thus,
needs to generate some kind of proof which can convince
the verifier about the validity of . Instead of proving is
a valid undeniable signature under , proves that
is valid either under or . This helps to conceal
the identity of the full signature producer and make the
arbitrator’s involvement transparent.
6) . Given a pair where
and two public keys , one can
verify the correctness of and . If both are correct, this
algorithm outputs “1.” Otherwise, it outputs “0.”
This algorithm actually verifies two signatures: and .
The verification of can be performed using ’s public
key, but the verification of the undeniable signature
needs additional information, which is in our protocol.
The purpose of is to prove that is a valid undeniable
signature of or , and it can be independently
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generated by (running the algorithm ) and arbitrator
(running the algorithm ).
7) . For a resolution query ,
from the verifier , the arbitrator first checks if
and has fulfilled the
obligation described in . If so, the arbitrator will generate
a full signature , where is a random
element in and are calculated as follows:
• The arbitrator uses the private key to gen-
erate an undeniable signature on the message
. That is, ,
and .
• The arbitrator then calculates the OR-proof
, where
and , are the sameas those in the algorithm
.Notice that the arbitrator is able to calculate a correct
if is generated correctly. (In this case, is true.)
As in the algorithm , instead of proving is a valid
undeniable signature under , the arbitrator proves that
is valid either under or . This helps to conceal
the identity of the full signature producer and make the
arbitrator’s involvement transparent.
8) . Given a valid mes-
sage–signature pair where
calculates and runs
the algorithm to verify
if . After that, calculates
and generates the proof as
follows.
• If can claim by generating
. Here, and
is the same as that in and .
• Otherwise, can deny by generating
. Here, and
`` ''.
9) . Given a valid mes-
sage–signature pair where , the
arbitrator calculates and runs
the algorithm to verify if
. After that, the arbitrator calculates
and generates the proof as follows.
• If , the arbitrator can claim by gener-
ating . Here,
and is the same as that in and .
• Otherwise, the arbitrator can deny by generating
. Here, and
“ ”.
10) . Given a valid message–signature pair under
and a proof , one first calculates
.
• If is a correct SPK of the statement or on ,
this algorithm outputs ;
• Else, if is a correct SPK of the statement or
on , this algorithm outputs ; and
• Otherwise, the output is “ .”
The correctness of our construction is due to the correctness of
the undeniable signature scheme - and the completeness of
SPKs.
In Section IV-C, we provide an efficient instance of the pro-
posed generic construction. The concrete protocol is based on
the full-domain hash (FDH) [48], [49] variant of Chaum’s un-
deniable signature scheme [42]. Section IV-D gives two variants
of our generic construction, which address the issues of multiple
arbitrators and designated verifier proofs.
B. Protocol Analysis
This subsection presents the analysis of the proposed generic
protocol.
Efficiency Analysis:
1) Partial Signature: The partial signature in the proposed pro-
tocol is a normal digital signature such as Schnorr Signa-
ture [34]. Thus it requires almost the same computational
and transmission costs as a normal digital signature.
2) FullSignature:Thefullsignatureofourprotocolismadeupof
fourparts:apartialsignature,arandomnumberin ,anun-
deniable signature, andanOR-Signature.Thecomputational
andtransmissioncostsassociatedwiththefirst threepartsare
self-evident, but the last part, i.e., theOR-Signature, is a little
bitmorecomplex.Actually,thesigningandverificationofthe
OR-Signature are themost costly operations in the proposed
protocol,andinaconcreteinstance(SectionIV-C),itrequires
almost5 timesmorecomputationalcostandhasadoublesig-
nature size of the partial signature.
Security Analysis: The purpose of this paper is to formalize
the notion of accountable OFE and show that there exists a
construction of multiuser secure accountable OFE with a trans-
parent third party. Thus the security analysis in this section con-
sists of two parts. First, we will show that the proposed construc-
tion is multiuser secure under the security model defined in [2].
After that, we will prove (in the random oracle model) that our
construction is an accountable OFE protocol with a transparent
third party. However, the proposed construction may not have
other properties required in specific applications. Nevertheless,
we believe the results shown in this paper provide a feasible ap-
proach for the design of accountable OFE with those properties.
Security in the Multiuser Setting: As we introduced at the be-
ginning of Section IV, our construction actually is a special case
of the generic construction of multiuser secure OFE proposed in
[2], namely the partial signature is an ordinary signature and the
full signature consists of the partial signature and an OR-Signa-
ture. The OR-Signature can be generated by the signer or by the
arbitrator. Thus, the security analysis of our construction in the
multiuser setting is almost the same as that in [2], and the details
are omitted here.
Accountability and Transparency: Before presenting the de-
tails, we first give a high-level illustration of how the account-
ability and the transparency are satisfied in our construction. The
proposed construction is accountable since the undeniable sig-
nature contains the information of the actual full signature
producer. However, it is computationally hard to tell who gen-
erates the full signature due to the anonymity of undeniable sig-
natures. When needed, the signer or the arbitrator can publish a
proof of the identity of the signature producer. This ensures that
the arbitrator in our construction is transparent but responsible
for its behaviors. The formal analysis consists of four theorems:
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1) Theorem 1–Theorem 3 are devoted to showing that the
proposed construction is accountable.
2) Theorem 4 is devoted to showing that the third party in our
construction is transparent.
Theorem 1 (Type I Accountable): Our generic construction
is -Type-I-Accountable assuming that
the underlying undeniable signature scheme is -Ex-
istentially Unforgeable, the SPK is -Sound, and the hash
family is -Collision-Resistant.
Proof: Let - be the adversary who wishes to
break the Type I accountability of our generic construc-
tion. At the end of the game, - will output a mes-
sage–signature pair , where . Let
. Let be the event that - wins
the game, i.e., . We consider
the following three cases:
: no collision happens on and ;
: no collision happens on and ;
: there is at least one collision on .
Thus, the probability that - wins the game is
We will show that (1) - in Case can be converted to
an algorithm - who breaks the unforgeability of the un-
deniable signature scheme; (2) - in Case can be
converted to an algorithm SPK- who breaks the soundness of
SPK; and (3) - in Case can be converted to an algo-
rithm Hash- who breaks the collision-resistance of .
Case : At the beginning, - obtains a public key
from its challenger of the underlying undeniable signature
scheme. - sets the arbitrator’s public key and
sends to - . After that, - runs the algorithm
to answer - ’s queries. As - has
private keys of users created by itself, it can simulate oracles
and by running corresponding algo-
rithms. Similarly, - can reply queries with the form
if the user is created by itself. The simulation
of random oracles can be done simply by answering randomly
but consistently. Below, we show how - can answer
queries and queries (with the form ).
For a query where is a valid par-
tial signature of , - first chooses a random number
. Then, it computes and sends
to its challenger as a query. Let the response be ,
which is a valid undeniable signature of (that is,
). After that, - computes as defined in our generic
construction and generates the SPK . While - does not
know the private key of , it is still able to generate in the
random oracle model using rewinding techniques. This is sim-
ilar to the proof of Schnorr signature in the random oracle model
[40], [41]. Finally, - outputs the full signature
as the answer.
For a query with the form where
is a valid full signature, - first computes
as defined in our construction. Then, it sends as a
query to its challenger. Once obtaining
the response (which can show whether or not),
- generates the proof or in the random oracle
model.
At the end of Phase 2, - will generate the target user’s
public key . After that, - will answer queries in the
same way we described earlier. These queries must satisfy the
restrictions in the game of Type I accountability.
This completes the description of how - can correctly
answer - ’s queries in Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase
3. Let be the output of - in Phase 4.
If the case happens, then has not appeared as one
of queries (as no collision happens on ) and
. Then, - can set as a valid forgery
of the undeniable signature scheme. If the underlying undeniable
signature scheme is -Existentially Unforgeable, then
.
Case : We construct an algorithm SPK- who can
use - to break the soundness of SPK. In the proof,
SPK- will generate all private–public key pairs and thus can
answer all queries from - . If the case happens, then
but - can output a full signature
and a proof such that
and . Then, either or
breaks the soundness of SPK. If the SPK is -Sound, then
.
Case : If this case happens, we show that an - can
be converted to an algorithm Hash- who can find a collision
of . In the proof, Hash- generates all private–public key
pairs and thus can answer all queries from - . At the end
of the game, if the case happens, then there is a collision of
. Hash- outputs this collision and breaks the collision-re-
sistance of the hash function . If is -Colli-
sion-Resistant, then .
This completes the analysis of each case. We have
obtained the upper bounder of , i.e.,
. Thus,
our generic construction is -Type-I-Ac-
countable, if the underlying undeniable signature scheme is
-Existentially Unforgeable, the SPK is -Sound
and the hash family is -Collision-Resistant. This
completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 (Type II Accountable): Our generic construction
is -Type-II-Accountable assuming that
the underlying undeniable signature scheme is -Ex-
istentially Unforgeable, the SPK is -Sound and the hash
family is -Collision-Resistant. Here, is the base of
the natural logarithm.
Proof: Let - be the adversary who wishes to break
the Type II accountability of our generic construction. At the
end of the game, - will output a message–signature pair
and a public key , where . Let
. Let be the event that - wins the
game. We now consider following three cases.
: No collision happens on and ;
: No collision happens on and ; and
: There is at least one collision on .
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Thus, the probability that - wins the game is
The followings are similar to those of Theorem 1.
Case : At the beginning, - will obtain a public key
from its challenger of the underlying undeniable signature
scheme. - will choose a random number from 1 to ,
where is the number of queries - issues to the oracle
. The simulation of is as follows. For the
th query, - sets and
. For other queries, - responds by running the algorithm
. For each created user, - updates the list and
returns the public key to - .
In some phase, - will generate the third party’s public
key . The simulations of other oracles are quite similar
to those in the proof of Theorem 1. In particular, - gen-
erates ’s partial signatures in the random oracle model and
uses its own challenger to generate undeniable signatures of
(or, verify their validity). The only difference is that - may
abort during the simulation of , whose probability will
be shown shortly.
If - does not abort during the simulation, then -
will output a pair and a public key . - will abort
if . We now compute the probability that -
does not abort: (1) The probability that - does not abort
during the simulation of is ,
where is the number of queriesmade to and is the
base of the natural logarithm. (2) In Phase 3, . This
happens with probability at least , where is the
number of all queries made by - . Therefore, - will
not abort during the game with probability at least .
Let be the output of - in Phase 3. If the
case happens, then has not appeared as one of
queries and . Therefore, if the underlying un-
deniable signature scheme is -Existentially Unforge-
able, then .
Case and Case : The analysis is the same as that in
the proof of Theorem 1.
This completes the analysis of each case, and we have ob-
tained the upper bounder of , i.e.,
. Thus, our
generic construction is -Type-II-
Accountable, if the underlying undeniable signature scheme is
-Existentially Unforgeable the SPK is -Sound
and is -Collision-Resistant. This completes the proof
of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 (Type III Accountable): Our generic construction
is -Type-III-Accountable assuming that the un-
derlying undeniable signature scheme is -Collision-Re-
sistant and the SPK is -Sound.
Proof: Let - be the adversary who generates two dif-
ferent public keys and wishes to break the Type III
accountability of our generic construction. - will output
, together with two proofs and . Let
. We consider the following four
cases: (1) : and ; (2) :
and ; (3) :
and ; and (4) : and
. Let be the event that - wins the
game, then
CASE : In this case, - can be converted into an ad-
versary - who breaks the collision-resistance of the under-
lying undeniable signature scheme. To do that, - only needs
to set and as its own output. If the under-
lying undeniable signature scheme is -Collision-Resis-
tant, then .
CASE : In this case, - can be converted to an al-
gorithm who breaks the soundness of SPK. As
and , either or breaks the sound-
ness of the SPK. If the underlying SPK is -Sound, then
.
CASE and : Similarly, and
.
We have obtained the upper bounder of , i.e.,
. Thus, our generic construction is
-Type-III-Accountable, if the underlying unde-
niable signature scheme is -Collision-Resistant and the
SPK is -Sound.
Theorem 4 (Transparent Third Party): The third party
in our generic construction is
-Transparent, assuming that the underlying
hash family is -Collision-Resistant, the SPK is
-Strongly-Existentially-Unforgeable and the unde-
niable signature scheme is -Anonymous. Here, is
the base of the natural logarithm and is system’s security
parameter.
Proof: Let - be the adversary defined in
Section II-D, who will provide in Phase 2.
Let be the response from the challenger. We now
define the following two events in the game.
: At least one collision happens on or ; and
: is chosen by the challenger when answering queries
to and .
Let and be the complementary events, respectively. Let
be the event that at the end of the game - outputs a
correct guess . Then, we have
We now show the upper bound of each probability.
First, we have if the hash family is -Col-
lision-Resistant. Second, as is randomly
chosen by the challenger between 1 and 2 , where is system’s
security parameter. It remains to consider the event
.
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Letting be the event that in the game, - generates a
valid message–signature pair of the SPK, which is not among
those returned from the challenger. It follows that
If the underlying SPK is -Strongly-Existentially-Un-
forgeable, then . We now calculate the upper
bounder of . We show that if the event
happens, - can be converted to an
algorithm - who breaks the anonymity (as defined in
Section III-C) of the underlying undeniable signature scheme.
Let be two public keys given to - in the game
of anonymity in the undeniable signature scheme. In Phase 1,
- sets and sends it to - . Then, -
will choose a random number from 1 to , where is the
number of queries - issues to the oracle .
In Phase 2, the simulations of oracles are quite similar to those
in the proof of Theorem 2. For the th user create request,
is set as . - will generate SPKs related to or
(whose private keys are unknown) in the random oracle model.
For or queries which require valid undeniable signa-
tures of or - uses its challenger to calculate
the responses and generates SPKs in the random oracle model.
The response to queries is the same as that in the proof of
Theorem 1. - could only fail in the simulation of
in this phase. As shown in the proof of Theorem 2, the proba-
bility that - does not fail is at least , where is the base
of the natural algorithm.
Let be the output of - at the end of Phase
2, - fails and aborts if . Otherwise, -
chooses a random element and computes
. Under the conditions and , has
not appeared before as one of queries, and thus -
can set as the challenge message of the undeniable signa-
ture scheme. After obtaining the response (valid either under
or ), - will generate the SPK in the random
oracle model. After that, the full signature is
given to - . - will not abort if , which
happens with probability . ( is the number of all
queries made by - ).
In Phase 4, - simulates all oracles in the same way we
described in Phase 2. As - is not allowed to make
or queries about , the simulation
could fail if one of the following events happens: (1) In the
simulation of or , - chooses a random number
which is the same as the in Phase 3. (2) In the simulation
of or , - chooses a random number
different from in Phase 3, but
for a query . (3) In the simulation of -
makes a query where is a valid
full signature, and .
It is evident that under the conditions and , the first
two events will not happen. We only need to consider the last
event, which requires and
under the condition . Thus, we have
as . We divide the event
by two subevents: ( ) and ( )
and . Let us consider .
Under the conditions and will not be the one gen-
erated during the simulation of and , and
if . Therefore, in this case, - does not obtain any
valid signatures of , but can generate a valid signature
(SPK) of . This breaks the unforgeability of the SPK. If
and , then and is a new valid signature
of the message , which breaks the strong unforgeability
of the SPK. Under the condition , neither nor would
happen. Therefore, - will not abort in Phase 4 under the
conditions and .
Let be the event that - aborts during the simula-
tions in Phase 2 and Phase 3. If this event happens, - will
pick a random bit and outputs as the answer.
Otherwise, the simulations in Phase 2 and Phase 3 will not fail
(which happens with probability at least ). Then, at the
end of the game, - will output a guess . -
will set as its own guess. If the undeniable signature scheme
is -Anonymous, we have
Thus, . It follows that
. Together with the
previous analysis, we have
Therefore, the third party in our construction is
-Transparent, if the hash function is
-Collision-Resistant, the SPK is -Strongly-
Existentially-Unforgeable and the undeniable signature scheme
is -Anonymous. This completes the proof of Theorem
4.
This completes the analysis of the proposed protocol. The
next two subsections present a concrete instance and two vari-
ants of our generic protocol.
C. Concrete OFE Protocol With Accountability and
Transparency
Let - be the FDH variant of Chaum’s undeniable signa-
ture scheme with the parameter .
The system parameter in the concrete protocol is
– , where are
the same as those in the generic construction in Section IV-A
and is another hash function . The details of
each algorithm are given as follows.
1) . The arbitrator chooses a random ele-
ment and calculates .
2) . The user chooses a random element
and calculates .
3) . For a message , the partial sig-
nature of is , where ,
and . (Actually, is a Schnorr
signature on ).
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4) . This algorithm outputs “1” if
. Otherwise, this algorithm
outputs “0.”
5) . This algorithm generates a full sig-
nature , where is the partial signature of
and is a random element in . and are calcu-
lated as follows.
• , where .
• To generate , first calculates
. Then, chooses three
random integers , and calculates
and .
• is an SPK on message , which
can prove is a valid undeniable signature of or the
arbitrator. One can make strongly unforgeable using
techniques in [27].
The generation of is based on the noninteractive zero-
knowledge proof for Chaum’s scheme reviewed in [45].
6) . This algorithm outputs
“1” if and
.
Otherwise, this algorithm outputs “0.”
Here, and
.
7) . This algorithm can also generate
a full signature . Here, is the partial
signature of and is a random element in . and
are calculated as follows.
• , where .
• The generation of is quite similar to that in algorithm
. To generate , the arbitrator first calculates
. Then, the arbitrator chooses
three integers , and calculates
and . One can make
strongly unforgeable using techniques
in [27].
8) . For a message and its valid full signature
under , computes
and generates the proof as follows. The
proof generation is also based on the noninteractive zero-
knowledge proof for Chaum’s scheme reviewed in [45].
a) If , can prove this by gen-
erating , where ,
and is a random
element in .
b) Otherwise, generates ,
where ,
, and
. Here, are random elements
in .
9) . For a message and its valid full signature
under , the arbitrator calculates
.
a) If , the arbitrator can prove
this by generating , where
and is a random element in .
b) Otherwise, the arbitrator generates
, where ,
, , ,
and .
Here, are three random elements in .
10) : For a message , its valid full signature
under and a proof ,
this algorithm works as follows.
a) If :
i) Output “ ” if
.
ii) Output “ ” if
.
b) Else, if :
i) Output “ ” if and
.
ii) Output “ ” if and
.
c) Output “ ” for all other cases.
Security of the Concrete Protocol
Accountability: Due to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the Type
I and Type II accountability of the generic protocol require that
the underlying undeniable signatures must be existentially un-
forgeable, the SPK must be sound and the hash functions must
be collision resistant. As a concrete instance, the protocol de-
scribed above is based on the FDH variant of Chaum’s un-
deniable signature (whose unforeability is based on the com-
putational Diffie–Hellman problem [45] in the random oracle
model) and SPKs (which are variants of -protocol and the
soundness is based on the discrete logarithm in the finite group
). Thus, the Type I and Type II accountability of our concrete
protocol can be reduced to the hardness of the computational
Diffie–Hellman problem in the random oracle model. Similarly,
due to Theorem 3, the Type III accountability of the concrete
protocol can be reduced to the hardness of the discrete loga-
rithm in the random oracle model.
Transparent Third Party: Due to Theorem 4, the trans-
parency of the third party in our protocol requires that the
underlying undeniable signatures must be anonymous, the
SPK must be strongly unforgeable and the hash functions must
be collision resistant. As a concrete instance, the protocol
described above is based on the FDH variant of Chaum’s unde-
niable signature (whose anonymity is based on the decisional
Diffie–Hellman problem [45] in the random oracle model)
and SPKs (which are variants of -protocol and the strong
unforgeability is based on the discrete logarithm in the finite
group using the method in [27]). Thus, our concrete protocol
has a transparent third party in the random oracle model if the
decisional Diffie–Hellman problem is hard in the finite group
.
D. Two Variants of Our Generic Construction
We give two variants of our generic construction.
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Variant I: In OFE, the role of the third party (i.e., the arbi-
trator) is to answer resolution queries and convert partial signa-
tures to full signatures. Like other systems with the third party,
OFE is susceptible to the Denial-of-Service (known as DoS) at-
tack on the arbitrator. A natural way to improve system’s re-
silience to DoS attack is to employ two or more third parties
on OFE, such that each third party is able to answer resolution
queries independently. In this scenario, “accountability” seems
indispensable since there are many entities having the ability to
produce full signatures.
To ensure the accountability in OFE with multiple third par-
ties (whose public keys are and ), we
only need to make slight changes to the generic construction in
Section IV-A:
(1) Define the statement as: ,
where
In this way, proves that
is a valid undeniable signature under a public key from the set
.
(2) Replace the algorithm with a new algorithm
, which is run by the th arbitrator.
: On input a valid message–signature pair
where , the th arbitrator first computes
. Then, this arbitrator computes
and generates the proof accordingly:
• If , output
;
• Otherwise, output , where
(3) The output of the algorithm is a public key from the
set or the symbol “ ”.
Variant II: The second variant is motivated by the designated
verifier proofs [50], where only the specified verifier can be con-
vinced by the proof. By incorporating the designated verifier
proofs in OFE, the signer and the arbitrator can prove to a desig-
nated verifier who is the full signature producer, but the verifier
cannot use the proof to convince anyone else about the iden-
tity of full signature producer. To achieve this, we only need to
modify the proposed construction (in Section IV-A) as follows:
1) Define a new statement , where
is the public key of the designated verifier generated
by the algorithm .
2) In , the signer proves to the designated verifier
that
or
3) In , the arbitrator proves to the designated verifier
that
or
4) The algorithm is only meaningful to the verifier ,
who is able to generate all the above proofs.
V. CONCLUSION
We formalized the notion of accountable OFE, where both
the signer and the third party are responsible for their behaviors.
This not only is the first complete definition since its seminal in-
troduction a decade ago but also provides a feasible approach for
the design of accountable OFE with other properties. As an ex-
ample, we proposed a generic (and also the first) design of OFE
where the third party is transparent and accountable. The design
is based on several well-studied cryptographic primitives and
satisfies all security requirements defined in this paper. A con-
crete instance was also provided to demonstrate that the generic
construction is very efficient to instantiate.
Our paper only makes the first step towards the formalization
of accountable OFE with a transparent third party, and there are
some issues that need further investigation. The three kinds of
accountability defined in this paper only capture the basic re-
quirements of accountable OFE, in the sense that each account-
able OFE protocol must have those properties. There would be
other specific requirements of accountability within concrete
scenarios, and identifying those requirements is one of the future
work directions. On the other hand, our protocol is only proved
secure under the random oracle assumption. While random ora-
cles have been widely used in security proofs, a provably secure
protocol without random oracles is certainly more desirable.
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